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ABSTRACT
POPULATION CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
Frank T. Denton and Byron G. Spencer
McMaster University
The rate of growth of GDP can be expressed as the sum of the rates of growth of the population,
the proportion of the population from which the labour force is drawn, the overall labour force
participation rate, the employment rate, and the aggregate labour productivity ratio. Making use
of this simple accounting identity we examine the contributions of the various components to the
growth of GDP and GDP per capita in the half-century 1951-2001, decade by decade, and the
prospective contributions to future growth under alternative demographic, participation rate, and
productivity assumptions.* This paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Economics
Association, Ottawa, May 2003. We thank Tom Wilson for his remarks as discussant on that
occasion. The work underlying the paper was carried out as part of the SEDAP (Social and
Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population) Research Program supported by the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Statistics Canada, and the Canadian
Institute for Health Information. We are grateful to Christine Feaver who carried out the data
assembly and computational work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Forecasting is an uncertain business and demographic forecasting is no exception. But the
natural human progression from one age to the next and the high degree of serial correlation in
fertility and mortality rates gives demographic forecasters an advantage that economic forecasters
can only envy. Uncertainty about future levels of immigration clouds the crystal ball but there are
virtual certainties too. Taking 20 as a rough marker for the attainment of working age, the
number of born-in-Canada 20-year-olds in 2023 will be determined by the number of births this
year. And (as we are constantly reminded) the population is aging as the baby boomers march
relentlessly toward retirement: we can predict with a high degree of certainty that the median age
of the population will continue to rise and the proportion 65 and over will increase markedly.
Conditioning on any level of immigration it is possible to make a reliable prediction of the future
population of working age. How many people will actually be in the labour force will depend
also, of course, on rates of participation, and that adds a degree of uncertainty. But for the next
two decades at least one can form a pretty clear idea about the range of possible labour force2
growth rates, and under reasonable assumptions about future fertility rates one can extend the
forecast with some confidence beyond two decades. Again though, that is conditional on what
one assumes about immigration. Immigration is the demographic wild card. 
The move from population and labour force forecasting to the forecasting of economic
growth introduces another wild card, the rate of growth of productivity. Productivity gains (by
any measure) are highly variable and average rates of increase have differed greatly over the
decades of the past half-century. We make use in this paper of a simple accounting identity to
evaluate the contributions to past economic growth of changes in productivity and changes in the
population and  labour force, and to assess the possibilities for future growth.
2. A SIMPLE ACCOUNTING IDENTITY
The players in the identity are real  , total population ( ), the labour force GDP POP
source population ( ), the labour force itself ( ), and the number of persons employed SPOP LF

























  *** *
is thus equal to the product of the population, the proportion of the population regarded as GDP
the source from which the labour force is drawn, the overall labour force participation rate, the
employment rate (or 1 minus the unemployment rate), and aggregate productivity, represented by
output per person employed. (Output per person employed reflects of a number of factors: the
capital/labour ratio, returns to scale, the state of technical progress, the proportions of high and
low productivity industries in aggregate output, average hours worked and the educational and3
skill composition of the work force.) The instantaneous rate of growth of   can then be GDP
expressed as the sum of the rates of growth of the variables on the right side of the equation:


























The rate of growth of   per capita can be expressed similarly as the sum of its component GDP
growth rates:
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Equations (2) and (3) hold (to a close approximation) if log differences are replaced by annual
percentage rates of change.
In practical applications of the equations to historical data   is taken from the GDP
Statistics Canada National Income and Expenditure Accounts; consistent revised series based on
current price indexing formulas are available back to 1961 and we have extended the series by
“old-onto-new” splicing to take it back to 1951. The population series is the Statcan published
mid-year series back to 1971, based on successive censuses and intercensal or postcensal
estimates, with adjustments to allow for enumeration undercounts (by age and sex); again the
series is extended back to 1951 by splicing to allow for definitional changes. The  series is SPOP
defined as in the Labour Force Survey as the noninstitutional population 15 years of age and
older; the  and   series are annual averages also defined as in the Labour Force Survey LF EMP
except that we have included the armed forces (based on data from the Department of National4
Defence and historical census data) and estimates for the Territories ( has been adjusted to SPOP
include the Territories as well), whereas the Survey excludes these components; also we have
incorporated adjustments to allow for Statcan revisions of the population underlying the
published Survey sample estimates. Based on the foregoing we are able to calculate a half-
century of growth rates to which equations (2) and (3) can be applied for historical analysis and
with which forecasts can be compared.
3. HISTORICAL REVIEW AND A STATUS QUO FORECAST
Table 1 displays annual average rates of change of  , population, labour force, and GDP
the  , ,  and   ratios going back five decades SPOP POP / LFS P O P / EMP LF / GDP EMP /
and forward five, based in the latter case on calculations that we refer to as a “status quo”
forecast. We begin with the past.
Looking Back 
Real   increased at about 4.4 percent per year in the 1950s and even faster,   5.3 GDP
percent, in the 1960s. (The decades shown in the table are defined in terms of census years but it
is convenient to refer to them as “1950s”, “1960s”, etc.) The growth rate declined somewhat in
the 1970s, to 4.0 percent, declined further in the 1980s, to 2.3 percent, and then increased in the
1990s to 3.2 percent. Overall, labour force and productivity growth were the major contributors
to this pattern. The baby boomers came of working age in large numbers in the 1970s, and that
plus continuing increases in female labour force participation rates sustained the   growth GDP
rate at a high level, in spite of much slower productivity gains and a noticeable decline in the
participation rates of men over 55. By the 1980s though the labour market effects of the baby
bust were beginning to be felt. Productivity gains continued to be modest (by the earlier postwar5
standard), the rate of inflow of young people into the labour force fell sharply, the participation
rates of older men continued to decline, and further increases in the rates for women  were
insufficient to provide  significant offsets. The 1990s witnessed some degree of turnaround: the
rate of productivity growth rose (though not to earlier postwar levels), there was an increase in
the employment rate (decrease in the unemployment rate) and by the end of the decade there was
some reversal of the downward trend in older male labour force participation rates (although for
the decade as a whole the overall   ratio still failed to increase). The 3.2 percent LF SPOP /
annual average increase in   in this final decade of the half-century was a consequence of GDP
these developments.          
Looking Forward: A Status Quo Forecast 
We present a number of forecasts based on alternative scenarios for the future, going out
as far as 2051. (The forecasts were calculated using the MEDS demographic software; see
Denton, Feaver, and Spencer, 1994, 1997.) The first, the Scenario 1 forecast, we refer to as a
“status quo” forecast. By that we mean the following: fertility rates remain the same as in 2000 at
all ages (the total fertility rate was 1.49 in that year, well below the natural replacement rate of
about 2.1); mortality rates continue to fall, as they have historically, but at a moderate pace,
producing increases in life expectancies at birth of 4.6 and 2.2 years for males and females,
respectively, by 2051, compared with 2001; immigration remains at 230,000 per year, roughly in
the middle of the Canadian government’s announced target range and consistent with recent
actual levels; annual emigration is set at  70,000, approximately its level in recent years; labour
force participation rates remain at their 2002 levels in all age-sex groups; the unemployment rate
holds constant at 7.5 percent, its average in the period 1998-02; and the annual rate of increase in6
labour productivity remains the same as in the decade 1991-2001, 1.61 percent. These
assumptions allow us to predict what will happen if “nothing changes.” 
What will happen is that the population will grow at a steadily decreasing rate until it
stops growing altogether by the middle of the century. The labour force growth rate will also fall.
By 2011-21 it will be close to zero and in each of the succeeding decades it will be negative. In
other words the Canadian labour force will actually decrease, starting in 2021-31, a reflection of
declines in the overall participation rate, which in turn reflect the shift in age distribution of the
adult population towards the retirement end of the age spectrum. Immigration will offset a large
part of the decrease in domestic supply but not enough to keep the labour force growing. Under
the assumption of constant productivity growth the   will continue to increase nevertheless GDP
but at a slower rate in 2001-11, and at slower rates still in the subsequent decades. Output per
capita ( ) will also increase more slowly, falling from an annual rate of 2.2 percent GDP POP /
in 1991-01 to 1.8 percent in 2001-11 and then to 1.1 percent in each of the next two decades. By
the last two decades of the forecast period the rate of increase will rise, though, to 1.4 percent, in
consequence of the cessation of population growth coupled with the assumed constant rate of
increase in productivity. Comparing the status quo forecasts of growth rates of   per capita GDP
with the historical rates in the top part of Table 1 we note that the forecast rates will be lower
than the rate in the 1990s but greater than or equal to the rate in the 1980s. If   per capita is GDP
viewed as a welfare indicator (albeit a crude one) the status quo scenario does not qualify as a
disaster scenario. But of course much depends on the assumption about the continuation of
productivity growth, one of the two wild cards in the forecasting game.7
4. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION
The other wild card, immigration, deserves special attention, partly because of its
historical quantitative importance and partly because it is the only significant, direct, and reliable
policy instrument available to the Canadian government for affecting long-run population and
labour force growth. The estimated contributions of immigration to population and labour force
growth in the last half-century and to the status quo forecasts are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1,
on a net basis (net of emigration), together with the corresponding domestic contributions. (The
figures in the table are decade totals, in thousands, rather than annual rates.) 
It is estimated that immigration accounted for more than two-fifths of the increase in the
labour force in the 1950s. Its share was much lower in the 1960s and 1970s, but then rose in each
of the next two decades. By the 1990s it accounted again for over two-fifths. Under our status
quo assumptions it will account for half of the increase in the present decade and by the next one
it will be the only source of labour force growth: the domestic supply will decrease and
immigration will be responsible entirely for the small net gain during the decade. In the
remaining decades of the forecast period even the assumed gross inflow of 230,000 immigrants
per year will fall well short of enough to offset the declines in domestic supply. 
Much the same can be said about immigration’s contribution to population growth. Its
share was in the range one quarter to two-fifths in the 1950s through to the 1980s, rising to half
in the 1990s. The status quo forecast has the share increasing to two-thirds in the present decade
and four fifths in the next one. With continuing low fertility rates domestic population growth
will be negative thereafter; the inflow of 230,000 immigrants per year will keep the overall
growth rate positive for two decades longer but will be insufficient to keep it from going negative8
by 2041-51.  In short, population and labour force increases, or the moderation of declines, will
be increasingly dependent on high levels of immigration far into the future.
The point can be made in a different way by asking what would happen if there were no
immigration. Leaving the other assumptions of the status quo forecast intact, no-immigration
calculations are presented in Table 3 and Figure 2. The calculations are done in two ways:
assuming that net immigration per year is zero (emigration as well as immigration eliminated in
the forecasts) and that only gross immigration is zero (no change in emigration). Both
calculations are of course unrealistic as forecasts of what will actually happen but they serve to
underscore again how dependent Canada will be on foreign sources for population and labour
force growth. If gross immigration is set to zero the population declines in every decade of the
forecast period while the labour force is hardly changed in the present decade and then declines
thereafter. If net immigration is set to zero the patterns are essentially as before; the decrease in
population is postponed (but barely) for a decade and the subsequent rates of decline in both the
population and labour force are moderated a little. But the inference is the same: heavy future
dependence on foreign sources.
5. WHAT COULD HAPPEN TO CHANGE THE FUTURE?
Many things could happen to increase growth. Fertility rates could start to rise, with
immediate implications for population growth and implications for labour force growth some two
decades down the road. Mortality rates could decline more rapidly, thus increasing the number of
elderly survivors, and hence the denominator of the   ratio, but decreasing to some GDP POP /
extent the number of deaths of people of working age, and thus increasing the size of the labour
force. Labour force participation rates could rise, with immediate effects on the size and age9
composition of the working population. Immigration could move to a higher annual level, and
with it the rate of inflow of foreign-born workers. Emigration could decline: fewer people of all
ages, but especially working ages, could leave the country. The rate of growth of productivity
could increase. We explore these possibilities in a series of scenarios alternative to Scenario 1,
the status quo forecast scenario. We introduce possible changes of the kind just enumerated, in
Scenarios 2 to 7, one at a time. Then, in Scenario 8, we pull out all the stops and provide a
forecast in which all of the changes occur simultaneously. Results are presented in Tables 4 and
5. Table 4 shows the annual growth rates of  , population, labour force, and per capita GDP
 for each scenario. Table 5 shows the same growth rates as differences from the Scenario 1 GDP
rates so that the incremental effects of the changes in forecast assumptions can be seen more
easily.   
Scenario 2: Higher Fertility Rates
The total fertility rate increases by 50 percent in this scenario, from 1.49 children per
woman in 2001 to 2.23 in 2011, with rates calculated by linear interpolation for the intervening
years. Age-specific rates change in the same proportion as the total rate. The effect is to increase
the annual rate of population growth from the Scenario 1 level by about a quarter of one percent
in the present decade, a little over two fifths of one percent in the next two decades, and six
tenths and then seven tenths in the last two decades of the forecast period (Table 5). The effects
on labour force growth are not realized in any significant degree until the third decade, 2021-31,
when the rate is higher than the Scenario 1 rate by more than half a percentage point. The rates
are seven or eight tenths of a percentage point higher in 2031-41 and 2041-51. With the
employment rate and   per person employed held constant the growth rate of total  GDP GDP10
changes in the same manner as the labour force growth rate. The growth rate of   per capita GDP
is affected differently though, in consequence of the addition to the number of mouths to feed
without compensating increase in the number of workers: the   growth rate falls GDP POP /
below its Scenario 1 level for two decades and then rises above it in each subsequent decade, but
only a little.
Scenario 3: Faster Mortality Decline
      The pattern of mortality declines by age and sex is altered here to allow death rates to
fall more quickly so that 2.2 more years of life are added to male life expectancy at birth by the
year 2051 and 2.7 to female life expectancy, compared with the expectancy gains in Scenario 1.
The effects are negligible in all decades. 
Scenario 4: Increased Labour Force Participation Rates
This is an important one. We assume here that male participation rates for ages 20 and
over will return (by equal annual increments) to their 1971 levels by the year 2011, which means
that the rates will rise from current levels in all 20-and-over age groups. (The 15-19 rate is
already above its 1971 level.) We assume too that the female participation rates will converge to
the male rates in every age group, reaching equality by 2011. The rates for both sexes remain
constant thereafter.  It goes without saying that these assumptions imply major changes in
patterns of labour force behaviour and that such changes would actually occur seems unlikely
(though not impossible – impossible is a risky word in the forecasting game). Indeed if they were
to occur there might well be other changes that would ensue as a consequence – changes to
fertility rates, for example. We ignore that. Our aim in this scenario is simply to squeeze out as
much as we can in the way of labour force participation effects – to see just how much growth11
could be added to the system if there were in fact large increases in participation rates.
1
What would happen is that the rate of growth of the labour force would rise sharply in
2001-11 from its Scenario 1 level. Some 1.7 percent per year would be added to the rate in that
decade, and there would be corresponding increases to the   and   per capita growth GDP GDP
rates. However that would be the end of it. Continued large increases in participation could not
be sustained and while the higher participation rates are assumed to hold in subsequent decades
in this scenario no further increases can reasonably be permitted. The scenario’s forecast growth
effects after 2011 are thus very small to negligible, reflecting simply the interaction of changes in
population age distribution with the higher (but constant) participation rates.
Scenario 5: Increased Immigration
   Here we assume a 50 percent increase in annual immigration, starting in 2003-04. The
number of immigrants thus becomes 345,000 in every year. The effects on the labour force and
 growth rates are identical and commence immediately. The rates rise above the Scenario GDP
1 level by about a third of a percentage point in 2001-11 and by a little more in the subsequent
decades. The effect on the labour force growth rate in 2001-11 is much smaller in this scenario
than the effect of increased participation rates in Scenario 4. In 2011-21 immigration has the
largest impact but by 2021-31 it takes second place to the increased numbers of young people
entering the labour force in Scenario 2 as the delayed effects of higher fertility rates in that
scenario come to be felt.
Scenario 6: Decreased Emigration
The annual number of emigrants is reduced to 35,000, a decrease of 50 percent,  and
remains at 35,000 throughout the rest of the forecast period. The effects are very small, as one12
would have expected. The effects on the growth rates of population, labour force, and GDP
never exceed about an eighth of a percentage point and the effects on   per capita are GDP
virtually zero.   
Scenario 7: Faster Productivity Growth
Labour productivity grew by about 1.6 percent per year in the decade 1991-01. We
increase that by 50 percent in this forecast scenario, to 2.4 percent. Needless to say that has
substantial (and equivalent) effects on the rates of growth of   and   per capita. It GDP GDP
adds about four fifths of a percentage point to those rates in every decade, compared with
Scenario 1. In the case of   per capita its effect on the growth rate is greater than the effects GDP
of any of the factors allowed to change in the other scenarios, with the exception of the Scenario
4 increase in labour force participation rates in the decade 2001-11. 
Scenario 8: Scenarios 2-7 Combined
We combine Scenarios 2 to 7 and allow all of the assumed changes to occur at the same
time in this one. In 2001-11   grows at 5.4 percent per year (Table 4), a rate just above the GDP
5.3 percent recorded for the decade 1961-71 and well above the rates for any of the other decades
in the half-century 1951-2001 (Table 1). The assumed very large increases in labour force
participation rates are by far the major source of such rapid growth, with faster productivity gains
a distant second and higher immigration a considerably more distant third. The increase in
participation is a one-time event though, and once its effects have been realized the situation
changes abruptly. The   growth rate falls to only 1.5 percent above the Scenario 1 level in GDP
2011-21 and then moves into the range 1.8 to 2.0 above in the succeeding three decades as higher
fertility rates finally fulfill their promise of more youthful labour force entrants and join faster13
productivity growth and increased immigration as a major contributor.
The increase in the forecast rate of growth of   per capita in 2001-11 in this GDP
scenario is phenomenal (or would be if it actually happened). The   ratio grows at GDP POP /
an annual rate of 4.0 percent in 2001-11, well above any decade rate in the last half of the 20
th
century. Again this is mainly the result of the assumed rise in participation rates, the effect of
which is to increase   without altering the population denominator in the ratio. The growth GDP
rate declines to 1.7 in 2011-21, rises to 2.0 in 2021-31, and  then rises further, into the 2.3 to 2.4
range, in the subsequent two decades, rates that are similar or somewhat higher than the rate in
the 1990s and appreciably higher than the rate in the 1980s. That  the   growth rate GDP POP /
is so high in these forecast decades is the result mainly of the assumed rate of productivity
increase. Putting the productivity rate of increase back to its 1990s level would result in  much
lower   growth rates in 2011-21 and the subsequent decades. Productivity increases, GDP POP /
like participation rate increases, leave the denominator of the ratio unchanged; all other sources
of growth affect both the numerator and denominator. 
Summary Assessment
A substantial rise in labour force participation rates could offset slower growth in the
working age population in the present decade, 2001-11. It seems highly unlikely that the very
large participation rate increases that we have assumed for analytical purposes would in fact
occur but even smaller increases would provide some offset. Beyond that, higher levels of
immigration could have an immediate and continuing effect on   growth but (within our GDP
accounting framework) only a negligible effect on the growth of   per capita. If fertility GDP
rates were to increase substantially, starting soon, there would be a significant effect on the14
number of new labour force entrants, but not for some two decades; the effect on the rate of
growth of   per capita would be negative during the interim period and positive but small GDP
thereafter. While much higher levels of immigration than what we have assumed in Scenarios 5
and 8 would increase labour force and   growth, more rapid gains in productivity would GDP
seem to be the only real possibility for raising substantially the rate of growth of   per GDP
capita, once any effects of participation rate increases had been realized.           
6. IMMIGRATION AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT
Let us suppose that   growth is the policy focus rather than the growth of   per GDP GDP
capita, or that for reasons outside of the framework of analysis in this paper it is believed that
increases in   growth, whatever the source, would somehow raise output or income per GDP
capita, or achieve some other desirable goal. Let us suppose too that fertility rates remain at their
current low level. The one policy lever available to the Canadian government that can increase
labour force growth and hence   growth substantially, without doubt or delay, is then GDP
immigration. One may think that other policy levers might affect other sources of growth, in
particular labour force participation rates, but the connections must surely be much weaker and
the effectiveness of such levers (whatever they might be) more speculative. Immigration
increases the population and labour force directly and immediately. With that in mind we
calculate the level of gross immigration that would be required in each of the forecast decades to
achieve specified target rates of labour force growth. The target rates chosen are 0, 1, 2, and 3
percent per year, plus the actual 1991-01 rate, which was 1.24 percent. The required annual
immigration levels are displayed in Table 6.
Annual immigration in the first forecast decade, 2001-11, ranges from -22,000 to achieve15
a rate of 0 percent (meaning that there would have to be an increase of 22,000 in emigration)
through 250,000 to achieve a 1 percent rate of increase, 545,000 for a 2 percent rate, and 870,000
for a 3 percent rate. To achieve a rate equal to the actual 1991-01 rate of 1.24 percent would
require annual immigration to be 317,000, substantially higher than the levels of recent years
(though not as high as assumed in Scenario 5). Maintenance of the 1991-01 rate in 2011-21 and
subsequent decades would require much higher levels still, ranging from almost 600,000 to well
over 800,000 by the last decade of the forecast period, as shown in Figure 3 (as well as Table 6).
To achieve a rate of 2 percent labour force growth by 2021-31 there would have to be more than
a million immigrants a year, and by 2041-51 the number would be more than a million and a half.
Even achieving a 1 percent growth rate would require well in excess of half a million, starting in
the decade 2011-21. Of course, fertility rates might increase (although to date there has been no
indication of that, indeed quite the contrary) but unless the increases are large and come soon the
prospect of stabilizing labour force growth by the use of the immigration lever is a daunting one,
to put it mildly.  
7. PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AS AN OFFSET TO THE DEMOGRAPHIC SLOWDOWN
There is no policy instrument that can guarantee productivity growth in the way that
immigration can guarantee labour force growth but one can calculate how fast productivity would
have to increase to achieve specified rates of growth of   and   per capita. We do this GDP GDP
and report the full set of results in Table 7. The specified   growth rates are 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 GDP
percent per year, plus the 1991-01 rate of 3.22 percent; the specified   per capita rates are 0, GDP
1, 2 and 3 percent, plus the 1991-01 rate, which was 2.15 percent.   
Maintaining a rate of growth of   equal to the 1991-01 rate of 3.22 percent would GDP16
require that labour productivity increase at 2.3 percent per year in the first forecast decade, 3.2
percent in the second decade, and then 3.3 or 3.4 percent thereafter, as shown in Figure 4 (upper
panel), as well as Table 7. Maintaining a rate of growth of   per capita equal to the 1991-01 GDP
rate would require a productivity increase of 2.0 percent in the first decade, 2.6 or 2.7 percent in
the next two decades, and 2.3 percent in the final two (Figure 4, lower panel, and Table 7). Rates
such as those that would maintain   per capita growth at the 1991-01 level are conceivable GDP
if the productivity gains of the 1950s and 1960s are any guide (see Table 1), but they would
certainly be much higher than what we have seen since that time. What good luck or policy
magic might bring them about is by no means clear. 
8. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We have presented forecasts going out half a century – conditional forecasts, of course,
depending on whether the “status quo” is maintained, or on whether this or that happens. Half a
century is a much longer period than what economists are usually concerned with, a far cry from
the forecasting of next quarter’s rate of inflation or next year’s rate of growth of  . But GDP
population change has great inertia and the current age distribution and fertility rates have
implications for decades to come. The “problems” of an aging population, or “challenges” if one
prefers, are not going to go away in a few years, to be replaced by others. They will be with us for
a very long time. Short-term “solutions” should be suspect. Think long.
In principle the economy could squeeze quite a bit more labour from the population if
participation rates were to rise as we assumed in our Scenario 4, and thereby increase sharply the
rates of growth of   and   per capita in the present decade. That is very unlikely to GDP GDP
happen to the extent that we hypothesized, but smaller increases would move the growth rates in17
the right direction, and slower increases would diminish the impact but spread it over a longer
period. In any event participation rate increases cannot continue indefinitely; were they to occur
they would simply put off the day of reckoning. In the longer-run – once the effects of
participation rate increases have been exhausted, if indeed they happen at all –  immigration
would seem to be the only source of sustained population and labour force growth on the
demographic horizon, and the rate of immigration would have to move to a much higher level if
labour force growth were to be stabilized. Of course fertility rates could make a dramatic
recovery, although from today’s perspective that seems unlikely. Canada is not alone in having
low rates. Indeed, all industrialized countries have total fertility rates below the natural
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The average U.S. rate is below but close to the
replacement level (although many of the fifty states are well below it) whereas Canada’s rate is
far lower – about 1.5 in the latest year for which a figure is available, and it has been inching
downwards in recent years rather than showing any sign of increase. But conceivably things
could turn around. Even if that were to happen though it would be at least two decades before
any significant effects of a fertility increase were felt in the labour market. (Any significant direct
effects that is; indirect effects might include some decrease in female participation rates, which
would tend to slow the rate of growth of the labour force.) Then there is the possibility of higher
rates of productivity growth, which would solve the “problem” very nicely. However
productivity is not something for which a government has a well defined and effective instrument
in its policy tool bag and there seem to be no particular grounds for optimism in that regard.
Let us end on a positive note, though. We are not ones to engage in what has been called
“apocalyptic demography” (Gee and Gutman, 2000; Evans et al., 2001). Elsewhere we have18
demonstrated (in spite of all the hype about population aging) that “dependency” ratios – ratios
such as population to labour force or dependent population (elderly plus children) to working age
population – are unlikely to rise in the next several decades above the levels seen in the 1950s
and 1960s when there were such large numbers of baby boom children in the population. (That
prediction holds whether or not one assigns different weights to old and young dependents to
reflect different levels of required support; see Denton, Feaver, and Spencer, 1998, 1999; Denton
and Spencer, 2000, 2002.) Of course, productivity growth rates were higher in those decades than
subsequently, and that is an important consideration. In the present context, though, our status
quo forecast suggests that if productivity grows at the same rate as in the 1990s, then   per GDP
capita will continue to rise at a rate equal to or above the rate in the 1980s –  and perhaps
productivity will grow more quickly. Who knows? Challenges yes, but not a scenario for
disaster. Economies are adaptive organisms. The Canadian one coped with the baby boom and
the baby bust. One way or another we can expect it to cope with the elderly boom.19
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Figure 3: Annual Gross Immigration, Historical and Level 
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1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1991-01 2001-11 2011-21 2021-31 2031-41 2041-51
Historical
Forecast
%Table 1:  Rates and Components of Growth:  Historical and Scenario 1 Forecasts
GDP POP LF GDP/POP SPOP/POP LF/SPOP EMP/LF GDP/EMP
Historical
1951-61 4.45 2.66 2.30 1.74 -0.48 0.13 -0.49 2.60
1961-71 5.32 1.68 2.60 3.58 0.73 0.18 0.10 2.55
1971-81 4.05 1.23 3.17 2.78 0.89 1.02 -0.14 0.99
1981-91 2.33 1.22 1.60 1.09 0.14 0.23 -0.30 1.02
1991-01 3.22 1.05 1.24 2.15 0.29 -0.10 0.34 1.61
Forecast
2001-11 2.52 0.75 0.94 1.77 0.36 -0.17 -0.03 1.61
2011-21 1.66 0.57 0.05 1.09 0.05 -0.57 0.00 1.61
2021-31 1.45 0.34 -0.16 1.11 0.04 -0.54 0.00 1.61
2031-41 1.54 0.09 -0.07 1.45 0.08 -0.24 0.00 1.61
2041-51 1.40 -0.05 -0.21 1.45 0.00 -0.15 0.00 1.61
25
Annual increase (%)Table 2:  Domestic and Net Immigration Contributions to Population and Labour Force
               Growth:  Historical and Scenario 1 Forecasts
Total Domestic Immigration Total Domestic Immigration
Historical
1951-61 4293 3,153 1,140 1,420 816 604
1961-71 3378 2,597 781 2,047 1,645 402
1971-81 2858 1,908 950 3,311 2,881 430
1981-91 3210 1,974 1,236 2,125 1,515 610
1991-01 3080 1,520 1,559 1,894 1,076 818
Forecast
2001-11 2402 777 1,625 1,602 791 811
2011-21 1951 351 1,600 88 -710 798
2021-31 1241 -359 1,600 -285 -1,083 798
2031-41 334 -1,266 1,600 -125 -923 798
2041-51 -191 -1,791 1,600 -363 -1,161 798
26
Labour Force Growth ('000) Population Growth ('000)Table 3:  Future Population and Labour Force Growth If There Were No Immigration
If gross immigration If net immigration  If gross immigration If net immigration 
were zero  were zero were zero  were zero
2001-11 -0.04 0.20 0.08 0.36
2011-21 -0.27 -0.01 -0.96 -0.64
2021-31 -0.57 -0.28 -1.38 -0.99
2031-41 -0.99 -0.63 -1.30 -0.90
2041-51 -1.31 -0.87 -1.56 -1.08
27
Annual Growth Rate of Population (%) Annual Growth Rate of Labour Force (%)Table 4:  Growth Rates Based on Alternative Forecast Scenarios
2001-11 2011-21 2021-31 2031-41 2041-51
Scenario
1. Status quo 2.52 1.66 1.45 1.54 1.40
2. Higher fertility rates 2.52 1.73 2.00 2.28 2.24
3. Faster mortality decline 2.52 1.67 1.47 1.56 1.42
4. Increased LF participation 4.24 1.85 1.51 1.59 1.46
5. Increased immigration 2.83 2.08 1.89 1.93 1.75
6. Decreased emigration 2.62 1.79 1.58 1.64 1.50
7. Faster productivity growth 3.31 2.45 2.24 2.33 2.19
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 5.38 3.21 3.28 3.48 3.35
1. Status quo 0.75 0.57 0.34 0.09 -0.05
2. Higher fertility rates 0.99 1.02 0.77 0.68 0.68
3. Faster mortality decline 0.76 0.60 0.40 0.17 0.03
4. Increased LF participation 0.75 0.57 0.34 0.09 -0.05
5. Increased immigration 1.04 0.92 0.69 0.45 0.31
6. Decreased emigration 0.83 0.67 0.45 0.19 0.05
7. Faster productivity growth 0.75 0.57 0.34 0.09 -0.05
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 1.34 1.49 1.23 1.12 1.08
1. Status quo 0.94 0.05 -0.16 -0.07 -0.21
2. Higher fertility rates 0.94 0.11 0.39 0.67 0.63
3. Faster mortality decline 0.95 0.06 -0.14 -0.05 -0.19
4. Increased LF participation 2.66 0.24 -0.11 -0.03 -0.15
5. Increased immigration 1.26 0.46 0.28 0.31 0.14
6. Decreased emigration 1.04 0.18 -0.04 0.03 -0.11
7. Faster productivity growth 0.94 0.05 -0.16 -0.07 -0.21
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 3.04 0.80 0.88 1.08 0.95
1. Status quo 1.77 1.09 1.11 1.45 1.45
2. Higher fertility rates 1.53 0.71 1.23 1.60 1.56
3. Faster mortality decline 1.77 1.08 1.07 1.39 1.39
4. Increased LF participation 3.49 1.28 1.16 1.49 1.51
5. Increased immigration 1.80 1.16 1.20 1.48 1.45
6. Decreased emigration 1.78 1.12 1.13 1.45 1.45
7. Faster productivity growth 2.56 1.88 1.90 2.24 2.24
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 4.04 1.72 2.05 2.36 2.27
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--annual growth rate of GDP (%)--
--annual growth rate of POP (%)--
--annual growth rate of GDP/POP (%)--
--annual growth rate of LF (%)--Table 5:  Difference from Status Quo Growth Rates Based on Alternative Forecast Scenarios
2001-11 2011-21 2021-31 2031-41 2041-51
Scenario
1. Status quo --    --    --    --    --   
2. Higher fertility rates 0.00 0.06 0.55 0.74 0.84
3. Faster mortality decline 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
4. Increased LF participation 1.72 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.06
5. Increased immigration 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.35
6. Decreased emigration 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
7. Faster productivity growth 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 2.87 1.54 1.83 1.94 1.95
1. Status quo --    --    --    --    --   
2. Higher fertility rates 0.25 0.45 0.43 0.59 0.73
3. Faster mortality decline 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08
4. Increased LF participation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. Increased immigration 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
6. Decreased emigration 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
7. Faster productivity growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 0.59 0.92 0.88 1.03 1.13
1. Status quo --    --    --    --    --   
2. Higher fertility rates 0.00 0.06 0.55 0.74 0.84
3. Faster mortality decline 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
4. Increased LF participation 1.72 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.06
5. Increased immigration 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.35
6. Decreased emigration 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
7. Faster productivity growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 2.10 0.75 1.04 1.15 1.16
1. Status quo --    --    --    --    --   
2. Higher fertility rates -0.25 -0.38 0.12 0.15 0.11
3. Faster mortality decline -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
4. Increased LF participation 1.72 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.06
5. Increased immigration 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.01
6. Decreased emigration 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01
7. Faster productivity growth 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
8. Scenarios 2-7 combined 2.27 0.62 0.95 0.91 0.82
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--difference from status quo annual growth rate of POP (%)--
--difference from status quo annual growth rate of GDP/POP (%)--
--difference from status quo annual growth rate of GDP (%)--
--difference from status quo annual growth rate of LF (%)--Table 6:  Annual Gross Immigration Required to Maintain Specified Labour Force Growth Rates
2001-11 2011-21 2021-31 2031-41 2041-51
Annual labour force growth rate
0% -22 242 278 213 257
1% 250 513 573 570 678
2% 545 875 1,040 1,205 1,525
3% 870 1,345 1,745 2,290 3,130
1991-01 rate (1.24%) 317 591 667 693 834
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Required Immigration ('000)Table 7:  Annual Productivity Increases Required to Maintain Specified GDP and GDP/POP 
              Growth Rates with Scenario 1
2001-11 2011-21 2021-31 2031-41 2041-51
Annual GDP growth rate
0% -0.91 -0.05 0.16 0.07 0.20
1% 0.09 0.95 1.16 1.07 1.20
2% 1.09 1.95 2.16 2.07 2.20
3% 2.09 2.95 3.16 3.07 3.20
4% 3.09 3.95 4.16 4.07 4.20
1991-01 rate (3.22%) 2.31 3.17 3.38 3.29 3.42
Annual GDP/POP growth rate
0% -0.16 0.52 0.50 0.16 0.15
1% 0.84 1.52 1.50 1.16 1.15
2% 1.84 2.52 2.50 2.16 2.15
3% 2.84 3.52 3.50 3.16 3.15
1991-01 rate (2.15%) 1.99 2.67 2.65 2.31 2.30
31
Required productivity increase (%)SEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS
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